CO129-180 - Public Offices & Others - 1877 — Page 274

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say, idolaters.

local priests against resident Englishmen as heretics, atheists, and, strange to It is true that the good sense of Malay parishioners, who prefer a certain profit to be made from the heretic in this world to the remoter favours promised for persecuting him in the next, rarely gives act to sneh instigations; yet harm has occasionally followed. This drawback is evidently referable to the inland and to outlying spots rather than to Manila, its neighbourhood, and the frequented coast.

Here we may briefly consider the dispositions commonly entertained towards British enterprize and trade by the natives, under which denomination I here, for convenience sake, include the Malays, Pagan, Christian, and Mahommedan, also the Chinese and the "Mestizos," or half-bloods, of whatever colour or race.

These then are, with hardly an exception, not merely favourable to, but eager for European intercourse in general, that of the Spaniards, as bad paymasters, excepted. On the other hand, the English, as the best paymasters, are the most welcome. Work, from the roughest day-task to a very fair average of skilled labour, plenty, if required, on reasonable conditions, and Malay honesty is, taking matters all always forthcoming in together, not, I think, inferior to European in corresponding classes and occupations.

There remains a third and not unimportant consideration.

Probable Future of the Philippines, in its bearing on European, and particularly on British, Enterprize in these parts.

Are the Philippines, then, exposed to any likelihood of a violent catastrophe, destruc- tive of or greatly injurious to the British interests vested in them, whether by revolution or rebellion from within, or invasion and conquest from without?

That the Pagan Malays, to the number, probably, of about 500,000 throughout the Philippines, are either passively averse from or actively hostile to Spanish rule is certain. That the Mahommedan Malays, whose number is apparently considerably larger, are yet more bitterly opposed to that rule is well known. That deep though smothered disaffec- tion pervades the bulk of the population, i.c., the Christianized Malays, is not less certain. That each and every one of these classes has, on different points, and at different times, repeatedly risen in revolt against the Spaniards, is matter of history. That the worst enemies of Spanish rule are the "Mestizos," or half-castes, scattered throughout the islands, is an axiom of the Spaniards themselves. That the Chinese are not merely ready, but eager to seize on any opportunity of shaking off the yoke of Spain, is doubted by

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And yet, with all this, I do not think that the Hispano-Philippine Administration is, or within any proximate time is likely to be, in danger from native insurrection. general rising, organized among the inhabitants of islands, separate the most one from the other by considerable distances, while the larger islands, as Luzon, Panay, Cebú, Negros, and Mindanao are themselves further subdivided part from part by almost inaccessible and often pathless mountains; islands inhabited by tribes so differentiated by course of time as to have almost or quite forgotten their common origin, and speaking a dozen different, and even, in some instances, mutually unintelligible dialects, is, to say the least, a very improbable event. A partial revolt has been shown by the repeated and bloody experience of the past to have little or no chance of success. Again, the Christianized Malays would hardly, even with freedom in view, fraternize with the Pagan, or they again with the Mabomedan. Again, the great influence exercised by the clergy over the Christianized Malays must be taken into account as a powerful counterpoise to anti-Spanish revolt. And what hereditary superstition cannot obtain by positive attachment and belief, it often obtains by habit and vague fear. Again, the "Mestizos," to whom as to their natural heads and fellow-leaders the Malays would have to look in any serious movement of this kind, are few in number and infirm of purpose. Lastly, the precautions carefully and vigilantly taken by the Administration against the importation of fire-arms and ammunition, except for its own use, though occasionally eluded, are yet sufficient to keep the mass of the native population unarmed; while the Spanish garrison, backed by a not inconsiderable naval force, is strong, not in numbers only, but in ammunition and arms of all kinds.

For the above reasons I think that a native revolt, of a nature to imperil the existing Spanish rule, and consequently to compromise, direcly or indirectly, British interests or establishments in this Archipelago, is a highly improbable contingency,

From without the Spanish Administration has yet less to fear. It is true that these Islands would be an easy conquest for any even second-rate European Power; it is also true that in the hands of an intelligent and civilized Colonial Government, such as England or Holland could readily supply, the Colony itself would be of enormous productive value. But the acquisition would be too vast for Holland and superfluous for England to

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undertake. Germany indeed might, and apparently does, desire a station in their neigh- \ bourhood, but not, there is every reason to believe, more than a station, such a one more or less as we ourselves occupy at Singapore or Hong Kong. Their doing so would no doubt annoy the Spaniards, but would not, or at least need not, have any tendency to dislodge them from the bulk of the Philippines. The remaining European Powers need not, it is evident, be brought into the present calculation. Remain China and Japan, either of which might at a future period become a dangerous enemy to the Hispano- Philippine Dominion; but such an event, though possible, lies at too great a distance to be included within the vista of practical political forecast. Hence the conclusion regarding disturbance from without is fairly identical with that regarding disturbance from within, namely, favourable to the permanency of the existent order of things, and consequently of the British interests dependent on it.

The only visible, though by no means imminent peril, is that Spain herself might through progressive enfeeblement, or in a moment of revolutionary crisis, so far relax her torpid hold over these remote possessions as to allow the Philippines to drift into a quasi, or perhaps a total independence. But this too is a far-off prospect; and I incline to think that for many years to come the Philippines will remain much as they are, little better, but also little worse. Administrative improvement is of course not to be expected; but neither is violent convulsion or sudden dissolution.

These things being so, remains a not unimportant inquiry-Is the protection at present afforded to British interests and British residents in the Philippines by the British Government through the Consular Service sufficient? and if not, what more is required?

British Consular Establishment in the Philippines, and its Requirements. Two things have here to be chiefly considered, the character of the Spanish officials, to whom the Consul is accredited; and the character of the British resident Colony, at the head of which he is placed.

Spanish officials in general are, as is well known, at once punctilious and indolent; exact about forms, careless about businees; unwilling to take any trouble except where their personal interests are concerned, apt to bully and domineer whenever they think they can do so with impunity; and amazingly ignorant of everything past or present, European or other, out of Spanish territory and institutions. The officials at Manila are, moreover, mostly of an inferior class; Colonial service, or rather the opportunities it gives of making money, being, it would seem, regarded at head-quarters in Spain as a current reward for services rendered by political partisans or dependants, ministerial hangers-on, Hence the standard of and the like, when their friends and patrons are in power. officialism is, say the Spaniards, lower in the Philippines than in Spain itself. Nor, in fact, can any one out here tell from day to day what strange freaks of interference the dominant officials may next permit themselves, or what arbitrary proceedings they may, in their ignorance of international and even of ordinary law, attempt or perpetrate.

Secondly. The British colony, that is, the resident British subjects in the Philippines, is important, large, and respectable. Important, from the weighty mercantile interests it involves and represents; large, not only numerically, but because spread over so vast an extent of sea-sundered territory; respectable, and that in a degree seldom met with else. where, both from the character of the business it carries on and, generally speaking, from the personal qualifications of those by whom that business is conducted.

To these two considerations may, as subordinate, be added a third-namely, that a British Consul at Manila, and with jurisdiction throughout the Philippine Archipelago, if he attempts to do his work conscientiously, and, so far as may be, efficiently, has not only an important, but a very laborious charge.

From the first and second of these considerations (for the third, and whatever conse- quences it may seem to involve, belong to the judgment of a higher competency), I draw the following conclusion :---

That, in view of greater efficiency and worthier representation, it would be highly expedient to confer the rank and title of Consul-General on the British Consular Repre- sentative resident at Manila.

The character of the British colony and its interests render such a measure appro- priate; the character of the Hispano-Philippine Administration renders it almost, if not quite, necessary.

For what regards a slight corresponding increase of salary, I think that one of two measures might be adopted. Either the Consul-General should be left, as the Consul is at present, to find his own office staff, in which case an increase of 3001. a-year, added half to his personal salary and half to his office allowance, may be held sufficient.

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